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NARCOINTERROGATION OF A CRIMINAL SUSPECT
CHARLES E. SHEEDY
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further studies in graduate theology at the Catholic University of America and was awarded the
doctorate in theology in 1947. Father Sheedy taught religion at Notre Dame, chiefly in the field of
morals, wrote a book and some articles in the field, and became Head of the Department of Religion
in 1950. He has another article on narcoanalysis which appeared in the May-June issue of Theological
Studies, Woodstock, Maryland.-EDiToR.

On February 18, 1955, in the Criminal Court
of Cook County, Illinois, Charles Townsend, a
nineteen year-old Negro youth, was convicted by a
jury of the murder of Jack Boone, and was later
sentenced to death in the electric chair. Boone
had been struck on the head, apparently from
behind, as he entered his apartment dwelling at
South Michigan Avenue and Thirty-fifth Place,
Chicago, on December 18, 1953 at 6:30 P.M., and
was robbed of his wallet, which contained four
dollars. The judgment of the Criminal Court was
affirmed on March 20, 1957 by the Supreme Court
of Illinois. Mr. Justice Walter V. Schaefer dissented from the decision of the majority of the
Supreme Court, and Mr. Chief Justice Ray I.
Klingbiel concurred in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Schaefer. As this is being written,
October 1, 1958, Townsend is still alive, in the
condemned cells of the Cook County Jail, while
his attorney on appeal, Mr. George N. Leighton
of Chicago, continues to apply the legal procedures that still remain available. Up to now a
total of thirteen stays of execution have been
granted in Townsend's case.
At the trial, the State relied principally on three
matters of evidence to connect Townsend with
the murder of Boone: 1) An oral confession made
by Townsend in the police station on the night of
his arrest, in the presence of an Assistant State's
Attorney and police officers, and taken down in
shorthand by a police stenographer. This confession was signed by Townsend in the Office of the
State's Attorney on the day after it was made,
and was then repeated orally by him at the Coroner's Inquest. 2) Testimony of a young friend of
Townsend, Vincent Campbell, that on a day in
December which he could not remember, he had
twice seen Townsend carrying a house brick in his
hand. (The killing of Boone had taken place on

December 18, 1953.) 3) Testimony of a twelve
year-old boy that on the day after the murder he
had found Boone's. wallet in the hall-way of the
flat-building where he lived, adjacent to Boone's
apartment. Townsend's statement of January 1,
1954 said he had taken four dollars out of Boone's
wallet after striking him with a brick, and had then
thrown the empty wallet into a hall-way.
It is very dear that, in the absence of Townsend's confession, neither the testimony of Vincent Campbell, nor that of the boy who found the
wallet, nor any other matters would have been
sufficient to have connected Townsend with
Boone's killing, much less to have secured a verdict of guilty. Vincent Campbell himself was in
police custody, under arrest, on New Year's Eve,
1953, the night when he gave to the police the information that led them to arrest Townsend.
And under cross-examination at the trial Campbell
admitted that he had hoped to help himself by
informing on Townsend. Also, Justice Schaefer's
dissenting opinion, by reason of certain circumstances which the Justice noted relating to the
timing of events, cast doubt on the corroborative
value of the testimony concerning the wallet. At
any rate, it is a certainty that the confession
clinched the case against Townsend.
At the time of his arrest, on January 1, 1954 at
2:30 A.M., Townsend was a heroin addict of four
years' standing. He had received treatment under
compulsion at the United States Government
Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, but the attempt
at his rehabilitation had been unsuccessful.
He had taken heroin during the hours preceding
his arrest, that is, during New Year's Eve. Seventeen hours after his arrest, (i.e., at about 9:30
P.M., January 1), Townsend complained to the
questioning police that he was "sick" and could
not answer questions until he had seen a doctor. A
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police surgeon was called to the station-house,
diagnosed Townsend's condition as acute withdrawal distress, and injected into his upper arm
sodium phenobarbital and hyoscine hydrobromide,
or scopolamine. Also, before taking his own departure, he left with Townsend four phenobarbital
capsules, of which Townsend said he took three
immediately. One hour and a half after the injections, Townsend made the statement which
was taken down by the stenographer.
Townsend was indicted for other robberies and
murders beside the crime against Boone, and apparently he confessed committing some of these.
The Chicago Tribune news item reporting the
thirteenth stay said, "Police said he admitted
killing three other persons in robberies to get
money to buy narcotics." Thus the decision to go
to trial in Boone's murder represented a selection
by the state from among various possibilities. At
times during the trial reference was made in testimony of various witnesses to "other matters,"
but these references were always objected to successfully by the public defender. Also during the
trial, when Townsend himself testified, he was
asked many questions about the cost to him of
maintaining his drug habit during the Fall of 1953.
Since Townsend was an unemployed drifter who
called himself a "professional pool-player," the
implication of this line of questioning was that
Townsend paid for his drugs by assaulting and
robbing people. And finally, in summing up the
State's case for the jury, the Assistant State's
Attorney made many references to "this fourdollar murder."
JUSTICE: IN LAW AND IN MORALS

Townsend's case brings up many questions relating to the moral implications of the use of drugs
in criminal investigation and procedure, and also
of the situation of a suspect who is also an addict.
The approach to these questions in this article is
moral, not legal-the approach of a Catholic
moralist not of a jurisprudent-but of course the
factual materials at inquiry are the same. Both
law and morals are concerned with justice, but
from different points of view. The jurisprudents,
lawyers and judges, are not so much interested in
justice as a virtue, an interior disposition, as in the
objective of this virtue in society: order and exterior peace. Order and peace are the ends of society; these ends impose themselves upon individuals
and command their attitudes even if it be by force

and social constraint. And these ends are accomplished to the extent that law inspires in each
citizen the proper social attitude.
But the moralist has other concerns. He is interested in the human person and his acts, because
the person is the subject of all morality. Respect
for the law is for the moralist an attitude of the
will, a moral act, and it is in the conscience of the
moral agent that he considers it. Moralists talk
and write about such things as decent and indecent literature and about the morality of political
and social institutions. In doing this they do not
mean to say that books or social institutions can
be morally good or bad in themselves, but only
that books can affect conscience, and that certain
institutions in their operation may or may not
have within them such principles and procedures
as will safeguard the conscience of those who
operate them.
It would be a false oversimplification to say
that morality concerns man's interior life, while
law looks only at his external acts. In fact, a constant preoccupation of law is the factor of internal
intent, so far as this can be determined through
legal procedure. And the moralist looks at the external act because it contains within itself the most
dependable evidence of the state of mind of the
actor. However, the professional concern of the
moralist is conscience, while that of the jurisprudent is peace in the social order.
Further, moralists and jurisprudents will often
occupy themselves with identically the same materials, the same facts, and the same procedures,
both aiming at justice from their respective viewpoints. In our present connection, the American
criminal procedure will satisfy the requirements
of justice both legally and morally, because this
procedure properly applied both guarantees order
and peace and safeguards conscience. And-granting his concern for conscience-if the moralist
finds something lacking, questionable, some doubt
of justice, he is not thereby attributing bad faith
or ill will to the participants. For in complex and
delicate matters, where even such things as basic
factual material are not completely dear, it must
be recognized that consciences equally in good
faith may reach opposite judgments.
The aspect of justice which concerns us here is
that which Catholic moralists call "distributive
justice": the obligation of society towards the
individual member, to give him his due in the
apportionment of the benefits and burdens of his
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life in the society. In American criminal law, the
right to due process in all of its implications belongs to the accused person by virtue of distributive justice; and it is further guaranteed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States and of
the states. Where distributive justice is concerned,
"society" in the discharge of its obligation does
not act as an impersonal monolith. Always involved are the deeds and words and procedures of
many individual persons making their ordered
contribution to the desired result. This division of
responsibility in distributive justice is clearly
apparent in a criminal procedure, where the complex whole is the product of the actions of many
persons: police, lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges,
and others. Every fact, deed, word, procedure, is
important within the total complexity.
For this reason, the reader should not be surprised or offended to see the moralist dwelling
upon and analyzing the minutiae of deeds and
words, not adhering to universal principles and
broad generalizations. For the moralist, the area
of study is human behavior, and this takes place
always in the particular, in individuo, never universally or in general. Principles of general value
are applicable only to the deed as actually done
and to its outcome. And finally, if deed and outcome are unclear and in dispute, there is even room
for some conjecture, though of course with nothing
like the authority accorded to the established fact.
SCOPOLAMINE

"Scopolamine" is a key word in the moral inquiry into Townsend's case. Yet the word appears
only twice in the trial abstract, both times in the
testimony on cross-examination of a medical
witness called in rebuttal by the state, and the
word does not seem to have attracted any attention. It does not appear at all in the appeal record.
Throughout trial and appeal, "hyoscine," a less
well known synonym for scopolamine, was used to
designate the drug which the police surgeon administered to Townsend in the police station before he made his statement.
But scopolamine, or hyoscine, is the original
so-called "truth drug." It is an alkaloid derived
from certain plants of the order of the solanaceae,
deadly nightshade, henbane, and mandrake.' It is a
sedative of the nervous system. In 1897-1899,
1 J. RoL%, POLICE DRUGS, translated, with a Foreword, by L. Bendit, New York (Philosophical Library)
1956, pp. 12 ff.
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in Texas, Robert House first reported on the use of
scopolamine in the treatment of morphine and
cocaine addiction. After the first reports on scopolamine by House the drug came into use as an
analgesic in obstetrics. It first appeared in connection with criminology in Dallas, Texas, about
1930. This marks the beginning of the use of scopolamine as an instrument of psychological analysis (narcoanalysis); previous use of the drug had
been as a sedative and analgesic. In 1932 Calvin
Goddard, of Dallas, Texas, coined the term "truth
serum," and made the claim that under its influence "it is impossible to lie." 2 The "truth
serum," along with the "lie detector," were widely
publicized in American journalism.
During World War II, narcoanalysis was used
extensively, first by Americans in North Africa
and then by the British, in order to expose hidden
fears of battle-shocked airmen and soldiers, and
thus to relieve them and make possible their return to duty. At about this time the barbiturates,
sodium pentothal and sodium amytal, began to
replace scopolamine as the drugs most used in
narcoanalysis.
In small doses, administered intravenously,
scopolamine and the barbiturates are sedatives
and hypnotics, quieting anxiety, and restoring
sleep in cases of excitement and depression. They
produce first a feeling of serenity, of well-being,
of friendliness. The patient loses his inhibitions
and becomes talkative; he will freely discuss his
intimate thoughts and experiences. When the
patient is "going under" or "coming out" of the
deep phase of anaestliesia, he will lose the upper
level of control, but he will still be able to talk,
and he may give out some materials which he
would normally repress. In short, the effect of
scopolamine narcosis or of the barbiturates is
similar to that of alcohol, but the release that
comes about through the drugs relates principally
to words, while that from alcohol relates to deeds
as well as words. Drugs are easier to handle in
narcoanalysis than alcohol, because the effects
are more standardized and predictable. 3
At no time in Townsend's trial or appeal was
any special point made in his defense about the
peculiar character of scopolamine as a speechinducing drug. This element seems to have entered the case only much later, in proceedings for
2Ibid.
3 E. L. KROPA, PsycieocnmsTRY, Lecture presented

at the University of Notre Dame, October 31, 1956,
p.

32.
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stays of execution. For example, a Chicago SunTimhes news item of March 22, 1958, (two years
after the trial and one year after conviction and
sentence were affirmed), says that Townsend's
counsel on appeal said he had "just learned" that
Townsend was under the influence of hyoscine, a
"so-called 'truth serum,'" when he made his
confession to the police. Also that counsel said
he "had information" that a police surgeon had
given Townsend an injection of hyoscine and a
barbiturate-along with four phenobarbital pills
to be taken orally-to ease narcotic-withdrawal
distress which Townsend was suffering while in
custody. The news item goes on to quote two doctors of the police medical staff saying that of the
ten physicians on the staff "none has administered any drug in the nature of a 'truth serum,' "
and that the police staff "never used anything
like that."
Yet there was nothing in the slightest degree
new about this "information" and there can be no
factual doubt whatever about it. The reported
case on appeal simply puts it as matter of fact that
"the surgeon gave him an injection of sodium phenobarbital and hyoscine hydrobromide"; and
summarizes the testimony given at the trial by the
surgeon as to his opinion of the effects of the in-4
jection which he had himself administered.
Therefore, there is no doubt at all that hyoscine
was administered, and that this was known at the
trial and throughout the appeal.
The difficulty might be resolved in this fashion.
Counsel's point may be that his position as of
March 22, 1958 was that the Supreme Court one
year before had not ruled sufficiently on the specific quality of hyoscine or scopolamine as a speechinducing drug. It is undoubtedly true that the
Supreme Court did make a ruling on the narcotic
aspect of Townsend's confession. The ruling was:
that the evidence did not show that Townsend was
out of control of body or mind when he confessed;
that there was no proof that Townsend was placed
under drugs for the purpose of securing a confession; and that the evidence did show that Townsend was capable of making a narration of events
and of stating his own participation in the crime.
But the point may still remain that these rulings
add up to what might be described as a rule of
law on confession under narcotics "in general,"
without specific reference to the peculiar charac4People v. Townsend, 141 N.E. 2d. 729, at 732, 735,
March 20, 1957. See notes, 52 Northwestern L.R.
666-681 (1957), 24 Brooklyn L.R.96 (1957).

ter of the drug in question, scopolamine, the famous "truth drug," used in narcoanalysis. This supposition is strengthened by the fact that the
majority of the court relied on precedent relating
to alcohol intoxication, never pinpointing scopolamine in any distinct way.
On the other hand, the statements of the police
physician in the news item that they "never used
anything like that" would amount to a denial
that the drug was injected precisely as speechinducing, in view of the purposes of interrogation.
They would not deny that hyoscine was injected
into Townsend, for that would be dearly contrary
to fact. In short, the medical staff says that narcointerrogation is not used in police medical procedure in Chicago.
But considering the timetable of events, the
physical and mental condition of the accused
person, and the actual outcome, this might very
well constitute a distinction without a difference.
The police surgeon administered the injections at
9:45 P.M. on January 1, 1954, and departed.
Present then were the suspect, the Assistant
State's Attorney, four policemen and the stendgrapher. The suspect was nineteen years old, of
subnormal intelligence, and a drug addict who
had just been treated for acute withdrawal distress. He confessed to the killing of Boone at 11:15
P.M., one hour and a half after he had received
injections of phenobarbital and scopolamine.
What condition was Townsend in, after the injections and at 11:15?.
As often is the case in forensic medicine, the expert testimony was partisan and conflicting.
Townsend's witness, a professor of pharmacology
and toxicology in the Loyola University Medical
School, said that the effect of the administered
dosage would have ranged from drowsiness and
apathy on the one extreme to complete disorientation and excitation on the other, and that there
would have taken place impairment of vision and
loss of memory. These effects could have begun
ten to fifteen minutes after the injection and would
have lasted for a period of from five to eight hours.
The police surgeon said there would have been no
cause to go to sleep, no impairment of eyesight,
no loss of memory or mental impairment-even
if Townsend had taken all four phenobarbital
pills on top of the injections. The police surgeon
said that a larger dosage than what he gave, an
"excessive dosage," would have produced different results. Townsend's witness, the Loyola pro-
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fessor, had had no experience with scopolamine,
and had never used it on narcotic addict patients.
The police surgeon had had fourteen years'
experience with narcotic addicts, and had handled
three thousand withdrawal cases.
Townsend himself said that:
Within a few minutes after the injection... his vision
became blurred, his memory failed him, he could hear
people talk but could not understand or recognize them,
he answered questions without knowing why, he
couldn't hold his head up, and his only sensation was
that he wanted to sleep. 5
It is undoubtedly true that scopolamine could
have been given as an analgesic, a pain-killer, just
as the police surgeon said, to relieve the distress
of narcotic abstinence symptoms. This was actually the first use of the drug reported by House,
and it was later used to relieve the pains of childbirth. The setting in the police station in Townsend's case is altogether different from that of a
directly purposeful narcointerrogation. In Townsend's case there was no psychiatrist present, no
direct tie-in between the narcosis and the interrogation and the confession. There was no admittedly
purposeful coercion, nor cajoled consent. Townsend actually asked for help, but of course -he had
no way of knowing what would happen after he
got it.
Yet clearly narcosis and interrogation took
place. The peculiar effect of verbal catharsis which
scopolamine produces (plus the sodium phenobarbital injection, plus the three pills) could have
taken place just as actually as if this effect, not
merely that of pain-relief, had been directly intended. The suggestibility, the amiable friendliness, the trustful and confiding attitude, and the
similarity to alcohol intoxication must be kept in
mind. Almost certainly the questions of the experienced policemen were full of suggestion, and
their attitude friendly so as to inspire confidence
and trust. And that suspect might have become
tipsy and talkative, like a person drinking bourbon
in a bar-not falling down, not stupefied, not dead
drunk, but making good sense, as the witnesses
testified concerning Townsend's condition when
he made the statement. Yet in the suspect's
condition, at that time, the actual statement itself
might have been totally untrue, or might have
related to matters which he had a moral and legal
right to suppress. And the timetable is exactly
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right for all this to have taken place before the
events of the night came to a close and the suspect
finally got the sleep which he said was all he
wanted.
It is true that Townsend signed the statement
the next day and repeated the confession two
days after that, at the coroner's inquest. But
this matter is tied up with another question
altogether, with its own timetable: the question
of Townsend's drug addiction.
The crucial characteristic of narcotic addition
is not compulsive use, not "kicks" or "thrills,"
but the fact of physical dependence. The addict
needs the drug chemically, and if he does not get
it he will suffer physical torture to the extreme
even of death . The flat narration in the Townsend
record does not describe his condition graphically,
but the symptoms are clearly there, and the urgent
truth is that these symptoms would recur regularly every seven or eight hours as long as Townsend abstained. The police surgeon testified that
he gave Townsend more phenobarbital during the
morning after the confession, before the suspect's
trip to the State's Attorney's office. But there is
no mention of other treatment between that
time and the coroner's inquest of January 4. Yet
during that interval the suspect must have been
given drugs, or else the same symptoms which
afflicted him on the night of his arrest would have
set in inexorably. The possibility is at least very
strong that at no time between January 1 and 4
was Townsend in complete control either of his
words or his actions.
ETHICAL ARGuMENT

Scientific, legal, and ethical authority coincide
against the reliability of testimony gained under
narcosis. "There is no such thing as a 'truth
serum': it is a journalistic fiction. Narcosis does7
not abolish the possibility of deceit and lying."
John M. McDonald, M.D., Assistant Medical
Director of the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital,
writes,8 that narcoanalysis "can induce a confession from the innocent." Dr. J.A. M. Meerloo,
distinguished Dutch psychiatrist, and Dr. Robert
S. De Ropp, a University of London bio-chemist
6

See description in ROBERT S. DE RoPe,DRUGS AND

Tm MnD, New York, (St. Martin's Press), 1957, pp.
152-154.
7J. RouiN, PoLIcE DRUGS, translated, with a Foreword, by L. BENDIT, New York (Philosophical Library),

1956, p. 12.

8 J. MCDONALD, JOUR. OF CRim. LAW, CRIMnNOL.,

5Ibid., p. 735.

AND POL.Sci. 46 (1955) p. 259.
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agree that "in fact narcoanalysis is no guarantee
of getting at the truth," 9 and that "there is no
evidence to show that either scopolamine or any
other drug can so relax an accused person's defenses that he unknowingly reveals truths he is
trying to conceal."'1
From the legal point of view, a note in American
Law Reporis says" that "a confession induced by
a drug ought to be excluded. There is great danger
that it may be false... mingled with fancy...
and ... moulded by suggestions." And a Federal
caseP says that "people thus prompted to speak
freely do not always tell the truth."
Finally, on the point of unreliability, the late
Pope Pius XII, in an address to the Sixth International Congress on Criminal Law, October 3,
1953,13 said that narcoanalysis should be excluded
from judicial investigation because too often this
method "produces erroneous results." The Pope
went on to point out that the resultant confessions
often coincide exactly with the antecedent desires
of the questioners, and mentioned "spectacular
and well known processes" of this sort.
Thus the stigma of unreliability lies on a confession obtained through drugs. It might be argued
in Townsend's case that the drug was not given
purposely to elicit a confession, but this would
make no difference if the effect actually followed:
Townsend's confession was unreliable.
But there is a more profound moral argument
9
J. A. M. MEERLOO, THE RAPE Op THE MIND,
Cleveland and New York (The World Publishing Co.)
1956, p. 66.
10 ROBERT S. DE Ropp, DRUGSAND =E MIND, New
York, (St. Martin's Press) 1957, p. 274.
1 ALR 2d 1307,'quoting 14 U. of Chi. L.R. 601.
2 Lindsey v. U.S.A. 237 F. 2d 893 (U.S.C.A. 9th
Circ
Alaska, 1957).
13
ACTA APosToLicAE SEDIS, 45 (30 Nov. 1953) 735.

against the legal use of information secured
through drugs. It is the denial of due process of
law, of the right of an accused, even a guilty,
person not to be a witness against himself. Ethically, this right no doubt rests on a profound human conviction that, in the absence of force or
fraud, or the implication of the innocent, the obligation of a guilty person is to repent and make
good any individual damage he.has caused through
his crime. There is no obligation to volunteer for
civil punishment.
Pope Pius X1' 4 placed this reason as primary,
above unreliability, in his statement against narcoanalysis: "(This method) violates a natural right
even if the accused is really guilty." Similarly,
De Ropp:15 "In the United States such a practice
would be contrary to the spirit of the Fifth Amendment, which was specifically designed to protect
accused persons from procedures which would
compel them to be witnesses against themselves."
And J. Rolin refers to narcointerrogation by police
as amounting to an assault on mind and will, a
form of "spiritual rape," a violation of the "secrecy of the soul."'1
Once more, in conclusion, it may be held that
these heavy strictures should not be made to lie
in Townsend's case because the injections were
made professedly to heal and soothe, not to extort
a confession. However, the result followed just as
precisely as if purposeful narcointerrogation had
been the express aim. Therefore, it is argued
here that Townsend was morally compelled to act
as a witness against himself, and was deprived of
justice and due process of law.
14Ibid.

25Op. cit., p. 274.
60p. Cit. p. 9.

